The Regulatory Offence Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Choice Architecture of Regulatory Offences

Abstract

Courts, scholars, and lawyers tend to overlook one of the most salient features that differentiate crimes and regulatory offences: choice architecture. The concept of “choice architecture” refers to how the presentation of options shapes decision-making. This article argues that crimes and regulatory offences employ different forms of choice architecture in the criminal justice process. It advances three core arguments. First, in the charging and plea phase, regulatory prosecutions nudge defendants to plead guilty by default, while criminal prosecutions automatically enrol defendants into non-guilty pleas. Second, when assessing culpability (or moral fault), regulatory prosecutions incorporate inculpatory default rules that presume guilt and foster efficiency. In contrast, criminal prosecutions incorporate exculpatory default rules that presume innocence and aim to prevent wrongful convictions. Third, in the context of sentencing, impecunious defendants who are charged with a regulatory offence must often opt in to receive a proportionate sanction. Outside of mandatory minimum sentencing contexts, defendants who are charged with a crime enrol into a sentencing scheme that considers proportionality constraints by default. Ultimately, this article deepens our understanding of the different choice architecture that governs crimes and regulatory offences, and lays the foundation for future scholarship that explores the criminal justice system’s choice architecture more generally.