Refusal of Sexual Intercourse and Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce
AbstractThe inclusion in the Divorce Act, 1968, of cruelty as grounds for divorce will raise the problem whether the refusal of sexual intercourse by a spouse can be considered as cruelty of the sort contemplated by the Act. The author examines the English cases deeding with this problem and concludes that there exists an area of conduct which may or may not constitute cruelty depending upon the attitude of the judge.
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